Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict in 2011, millions of Syrians have been forced to migrate to neighboring countries. The majority of them have settled in Turkey. Despite this, few studies have focused on the bilateral relations between the Syrian guests and Turkish hosts in the land. This quantitative study, conducted in two cities in the eastern Mediterranean (Mersin and Adana), adds to the literature of an emerging and dynamic field of migration and refugee studies in Turkey and is our attempt to help close gaps in research. Although no direct discrimination or harsh hostilities between the two groups have been identified, Syrians seem to feel culturally close to their hosts. Turks, on the other hand, lack trust in Syrians and display views about them that are at times based on some negative stereotypes. We also found that for Turks, the Syrian problem is considered to be a temporary issue. While the temporal quality of discussions about the classic anthropological other often permeates academic discussions about immigrants and refugees, the lack of structured policies in Turkey, as well as the use of narratives and discourses to influence public opinion in its stead, has fed popular narratives about Syrians as passive recipients of charity and a transitory population. This occurs despite the probability that Syrians may in fact soon become a recognized and sizeable Arab-speaking minority in Turkey.
Millions of Syrians have been forced to migrate to bordering countries since the Syrian conflict began in 2011. The majority have (temporarily) settled in Turkey. Because of its duration, magnitude, and violence, the Syrian war has been described by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as one of this century's great catastrophes, as well as one of the most destructive conflicts in modern history. The approximate population of Syria was 19.6 million in 2008 (United Nations, 2013) and 21.1 million in 2013 (or 23.3 million according to the Central Bureau of Statistics).
1 By 2014, it had declined to nearly 18 million (CIA, 2015) , which is the same population Syria had in 2004. In September 2013, the UNHCR (2015) announced that the number of Syrians forced out of Syria since March 2011 had surpassed 2 million. According to an Amnesty International (2016) report, by September 2015 that number had already doubled, with more than 4 million Syrians being hosted in five main countries in the eastern Mediterranean: Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt. Only 1.7% has been offered sanctuary by the rest of the world since the crisis began (Amnesty International, 2015) . According to the UNHCR, the estimated number of Syrians currently living in Turkey is approximately 3 million. However, the number of those who have not yet registered is unknown (UNHRC, 2016) .
Observing the sharp rise in the number of Syrians arriving in southeast Turkey, one becomes concerned with the relations between the populations of guests (Syrians) and hosts (Turkish), given the overall lack of job opportunities, accommodations, and basic services in the region. We researched the issue in the literature and found a rapidly growing field of migration and refugee studies in Turkey that now take stock of Turkey's transformation into an immigration country and a major destination for refugees in the region (Tolay, 2015) . A few studies in this growing body of work mentioned Turkish-Syrian relations, but only a few addressed bilateral relations. For example, a Turkish NGO, the Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants (SGDD), 2 published a study in 2011 on the topic of Syrian refugees in Turkey while focusing primarily on the opinions of the Turkish population. IPSO/Glob@l Adviser 3 also published an enquiry on the same topic in 2012 that focused exclusively on Turkish attitudes within the broader topic of immigration.
Transatlantic Trends (The German Marshall Fund [GMF] ) published yet another study in 2013 also focusing on European and American perceptions about immigration that also included Turkey, though questions were directed at Turkish respondents only. Another set of quantitative data was made available by the Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) in January 2014 on the issue of Syrian refugees; though it focused on public opinion related to the policies that respondents (Turkish) thought the Turkish government should implement towards Syrian refugees; it did not focus on opinions about or from the refugees themselves. In addition, these studies were also carefully analyzed by Tolay (2013) , who added the results from her own qualitative study involving 88 interviews with various stakeholders in Turkey. After consulting all four databases and her own, as well as adding her own experience as a long-term participant-observer in Turkey, Tolay (2013, p.1) concluded that there is an increasing urgency to shape public opinion towards refugees in Turkey by raising the levels of awareness and knowledge on the issue, but also more importantly by constructively deconstructing the impression that Turkey is benevolent towards refugees, by accompanying and positively shaping the politicization of the issue, and by re-centering discourse on the rights of refugees and individual accountability for securing such rights.
Furthermore, Erdoğan (2014) conducted a study in six different Turkish cities (three border and three non-border cities: Gaziantep, Hatay, Kilis, Istanbul, Izmir, & Mersin, respectively) as part of the Hacettepe University Migration and Politics Research Centre's project (HUGO) between February and April 2014. One-hundred forty-four interviews (72 with Turks and 72 with Syrians) were added to a qualitative study on NGO's and local media. Erdoğan concluded that although the overall climate was one of cooperation and understanding between Syrians and Turks, "concerns and objections increase as the permanency of Syrians in Turkey becomes more visible" (p. 65). He also pointed to what Kemal Kirisci and colleagues described as the "limits of hospitality" (Dinçer et al., 2013) to suggest that the situation in Turkey has perhaps become unmanageable. For example, a report from GMF titled Transatlantic Trends: Mobility, Migration and Integration (2014) found that 77% of Turks think that the reason migrants come to their country is primarily to seek asylum. 47% think that they come to use social benefits. 77% said they were worried about refugees in their country, and 66% favored more restrictive immigration policies. Yet another report from GMF, this time conducted in October 2015, revealed an overall "negative attitude toward immigrants in the country, though given the scale of the refugee crisis in Turkey, the results could be considered moderate" (2015, p. 12 Orhan, 2015) but had little to say about the opinions of Syrian refugees towards their hosts. Another report published by the Middle Eastern Research Network (MDN), who conducted a survey on Syrian-Turkish harmonization in the city of Gaziantep (see Altengi, Al-Bahr, Najjar, Babelli, & Asheer, 2015) , was one of the few studies that did investigate Syrian-Turkish relations bilaterally and, as a result, was useful for comparative purposes. In fact, this study was conducted alongside ours in February 2015. Hence, although the aforementioned studies are important for understanding how the Turkish population views the Syrian crisis and what their role is in helping alleviate the refugee crisis, with the exception of Altengi et al. (2015) and Erdoğan (2015) , the most recent studies somewhat neglect Syrian refugees' own views and opinions. This has the effect of turning them into passive agents in what is, in fact, a bilateral exchange of culture, language, society, and politics between an incoming heterogeneous population and a multi-religious, multi-ethnic, multicultural and, as such, highly diverse host society. Therefore, this study is a modest attempt to help close this gap.
This analysis begins with a description of the research methodology applied in the study followed by a description of the sample. It then moves on to analyze the responses emerging from the Turkish and Syrian samples separately while organizing the findings into the following clusters: education, Syrians' working class and economic class, language barriers, cultural proximity/distance, and trust. The issue of Syrians' unsettled status (temporariness) and the notion of burden are also looked at. Data presentation is followed by a discussion of some basic theoretical social-scientific work on migration that points specifically to the persistence of the issue of temporariness in migration studies. The need for a change to take place both in theorizing and policy-making toward victims of forced migration is suggested. Syrians' current legal status and the situations experienced by them while living in Turkey are debated to eschew most typologies designed to understand migration patterns in Europe (the three most commonly accepted immigration models being integrationist, assimilationist, and multiculturalist) while generating its own, which could perhaps be referred to as selective temporary settlement.
Methodology
The present study is an interdisciplinary exercise that relies on insights from both sociology and psychology. 4 It was decided to approach the subject matter 4 I would like to thank Dr. Timucin Aktan for the invaluable help provided in regard to translating from English to Turkish, certain aspects of data analysis and data collection, as well as for clarifying some psychological constructs.
from an inductive, descriptive perspective, as opposed to correlational, while avoiding sensitive questions (i.e., questions related to religion, sexual orientation, political views, personal beliefs, or reasons for coming to Turkey). 5 Therefore, the measurement scales were appropriate for descriptive quantitative analysis. Two cities familiar to the primary author were identified, Adana and Mersin (this includes Mersin's metropolitan area and Tarsus), as places where a large number of Syrians are known to have settled in urban areas as opposed to camps.
Sample Description
The data was collected in the central and metropolitan areas of Mersin and Adana between January and February 2015 with a total of 1,109 participants. Of these, 506 were Turkish (46%) and 603 were Syrians (54%). Seven individuals from the Turkish sample (1%) and 40 from the Syrian sample (7%) were excluded due to incomplete surveys (criterion used for exclusion was having less than 80% of the items completed).
Measurement
Two survey questionnaires were constructed for the Syrian and Turkish samples. Surveys were comprised of several items aimed at collecting basic demographic information and opinions about Syrian and Turkish perceptions, interactions, and experiences with one another. The surveys were originally developed in English and translated to Arabic and Turkish by native speakers of both languages. A bilingual psychology student translated items into Arabic while a Syrian professional translated them back to English for accuracy. The Turkish survey was translated by a native Turkish speaker (psychology lecturer) and translated back by a bilingual PhD student from the psychology department. Minor discrepancies between the original and retranslated versions were corrected with the aid of two other unrelated translators who were unaware of the aims of the research or the identity of the former translators. This method ensured the highest quality of translations and accuracy of terminology.
The study was designed to measure a wide range of attitudes and opinions in both samples. However, preliminary analyses revealed no comparable factors that could be measured between the two different questionnaires. Thus, the research strategy had to be changed to accommodate a more qualitative approach. Because survey questionnaires generally focus on opinions rather than measurable psychological constructs such as attitudes, there was no need to construct criteria that measured validity or internal consistency (Cohen & Swerdlik, 2010) . Instead, the questionnaires' face validities were provided through the positive feedback of our interpretations. For example, the results were presented to the board of directors of a Syrian charitable organization responsible for welcoming Syrians to Mersin in order to receive constructive criticism from those working in the front lines of social services. Our preliminary results were also presented in academic conferences in Turkey, the United Kingdom, Russia, and Brazil, where the results of this enquiry were discussed. The feedback received was constructive and overall positive.
Data Collection
The strategy regarding data collection was to distribute anonymous questionnaires in Turkish and Arabic amongst the target populations to Turkish and Syrian individuals no younger than 18 years of age. The questionnaires corresponded to a number of Likert-type scale items, forming a multi-scale survey. Recruiting participants was achieved by selecting neighborhoods with the highest concentration of Syrians in each of the studied cities. Private businesses owned or staffed by Syrians were identified, such as cafes and restaurants. We also interviewed people in shopping centers and supermarkets, as well as in poorer neighborhoods and the outskirts of the selected urban areas. The intention was to capture a wide range of opinions from Syrians and Turks belonging to diverse social and economic backgrounds. Although the geography of this study was selected on the basis of the concentration of immigrants living there, the selection of individual respondents was completely arbitrary with the exception of gender. In other words, at some point in the development of the project there was a need to focus more on identifying female participants. This occurred because of the tendency of Syrian women to shy away from answering surveys for cultural reasons. Once the gender imbalance was corrected, it was then possible to return to arbitrary sampling. Any other variable (education or economic status, for example) occurred naturally.
Various techniques for recruiting individual participants were used, including direct first contact in public spaces, such as stopping people at the seaside (Mersin), or in parks (Adana), markets, or boulevards. In order to guarantee randomness, snowballing techniques were largely avoided. Participants were also interviewed in their homes and at their place of work. Permission was asked from the management of shopping centers and local businesses to interview their employees and clients. Research assistants were not allowed to interview members of their own family or friends who might know the aims of the research. Participants were given the contact details of the principal investigator and were offered ample possibility to withdraw from the research at any given time. (SD = 10.95) . Again, the age difference between men and women was not significant (t 521 = .64, p > .05). From this, one can conclude that the average age was of a relatively young population was 30 years of age for both men and women. This was characteristic of the other two (yet unpublished) studies that we have conducted. Hidden in this finding is the realization that the more mobile people (the younger generation) are the ones who can more easily cross the border into Turkey and further into Europe. This raises questions regarding the fate of the older, less-mobile individuals who may be trapped at home in Syria and be much more at risk for this reason as the conflict in the largest and most populous cities in Syria intensifies. It also raises policy questions, challenges, and opportunities for transition and destination countries regarding the demography of forced migration in the region.
Results and Discussion
Education. Most of our Turkish sample had university-level education (44.9%), with 33.6% having a high school, and 8.2% a secondary-school education level. With regards to the Syrian sample, we found a similar pattern. The majority of participants (48.3%) were at the university level, whereas 21.7% had a high-school and 16.9% a secondary-school education level. This carries the conclusion that the sample total (all of whom were adults 18 years or older) was somewhat well educated. A minority (0.6%) of the Turkish sample had attended PhD courses and other graduate courses (1.4 %) while 8% were secondary-school students; 6.2% had attended primary school. In the Syrian sample, we only see a minority with a primary-school education level (7.3%). Turkish state-funded universities do not offer courses in English or any other language besides Turkish, and private universities in the region are costly with tuition exceeding 20,000 Turkish Liras per academic year, a large sum of money even for local well-off Turkish people. With regard to education, one finds no significant difference between men and women. Of the total sample (Turks and Syrians combined), 46.3% of men had university-level education compared to 42.3% of women. The difference is not large, but it does show that men are slightly more educated than women. All other indicators regarding gender and education follow suit, with men always having a slightly higher percentage. One finds, as in the Turkish sample, Syrian males to have higher levels of undergraduate education than women. However, the difference is not significant (49.2% for men; 48.6% for women). Among the Syrian population, the proportion of women with high-school education levels was higher (20.9%) than men (13.6%). Syrian men (49.2% at university level) and Syrian women (48.6%) were better educated, followed by Turkish women (46.7%). This indicates that the least educated group was Turkish men (43.1% at the university level). However, Turkish men and women were better represented at the high-school level. From this finding, we concluded that most of our sample had a similar educational background, almost equally divided between genders. All this offers good grounds for a comparative analysis of opinions between the two groups.
Economic class and income distribution. Data on income was collected by dividing occupation into four main categories: high-income, upper-middle, lowermiddle, and low income. In order to index the relevant earnings with these categories, a standard measure used for countries without exchangeable currencies by the International Monetary Fund and by the World Bank was used. The result was a noted difference between the Syrian and Turkish samples regarding the percentage of lowincome respondents. For example, more than half of the Turkish sample was classified as low-income (52.5%), as opposed to 29.5% of Syrians. In the scale's lower-middle income category, 44.1% of Syrians were found there in contrast to 27.1% of the Turkish sample. Differences were not so great for the two remaining upper categories. While 23.2% of Syrians were categorized as upper-middle income, the percentage of Turkish individuals found in this category was 17.1%. In the last category (high income) the difference was not significant: 3.4% of Syrians and 2.5% of Turks. It is tempting to conclude from this data that the Turkish sample appears to have less economic power than the Syrians who were interviewed, something that at first may sound counterintuitive given that victims of forced migration are often portrayed as poorer than the host community that receives them. However, this could also be a reflection of how Syrians interpreted the questionnaire, as they may have attributed their occupation to what they used to do in Syria. That said, and given the higher educational status of our Syrian sample, it is also possible that the Syrian population we interviewed is predominantly composed of members of the lowermiddle or even upper-middle classes. This would make sense if we consider the high cost of immigration. In the cities where we collected data, numerous relatively new and rather expensive automobiles with Syrian number plates are seen arriving. This indicates that a good number of Syrian middle-class individuals are crossing the border, as for them to migrate further away from the Syrian border would be a less cumbersome option than for the lower classes who tend to remain in the camps or at the border towns closer to Syria, in cities such as Gaziantep, Hatay, or Kilis.
Opinions of Turkish Hosts towards Syrian Guests
Welcome versus acceptance. The most significant findings are presented on an item-by-item basis. To facilitate visualization, the bar graphs presented henceforth will always show the highest percentage on the left and the lowest on the right. Hence, attention must be paid to the fact that the position or order in which the negative, positive, and neutral responses are presented can change with each graph. Also, to enhance clarity and make the description of the data briefer, the categories strongly agree and agree, as well as strongly disagree and disagree, were combined.
Regarding the statement, "Syrian refugees should be welcomed in Turkey," 41.9% of Turkish respondents believe that Syrians should not be welcomed to Turkey, as opposed to 45.9% who do. The result of the combination of categories shows that respondents were divided on the issue, with slightly more people responding positively than negatively. Still, 41.9% shows a high rate of disapproval considering the seriousness of the conflict in Syria and Syrians' need to find refuge. A small number of respondents (11.5%) strongly agreed with the statement, "Syrian refugees should be welcomed in Turkey." Likewise, when asked to respond to the statement, "Syrian refugees should have the right to seek asylum in Turkey," 47.5% of respondents were found to either disagree or strongly disagree with the statement. Only a small number said they strongly agreed (10.3%). For the statement, "Syrian refugees should not be accepted in Turkey," 39.5% were found to agree or strongly agree with the statement, with 46.3% either disagreeing or strongly disagreeing. This seems to show that Turkish respondents prefer the idea of accepting refugees on the basis of their temporary basic needs rather than welcoming (pro-actively inviting) refugees into Turkey.
Temporariness. More negative opinions towards Syrians were detected when visa and right to remain were added to the statements (i.e., "Syrian immigrants should be granted visas and the right to stay in Turkey, providing they fit the criteria"). What was found in this case was that 60.4% of respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement. Only 7% of those interviewed strongly agreed, while 15.5% were undecided. Once again, this reveals the perception that Syrians are only in Turkey temporarily. The theme of temporariness is somewhat re-enforced by the responses to the statement, "Refugees must return to their country at the end of the war." Most of the Turkish sample (82.3%) either agreed (33%) or strongly agreed (49.3%) that this should be the case, which shows that in the minds of Turkish hosts, Syrians are categorically considered to be a temporary population.
Trust. The issue of temporariness is reflected on another important theme arising from the data: trust. Following the statement, "I would hire Syrians to work for me," as many as 46.9% of those interviewed said they either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement. A minority (9.8%) said they strongly agreed with the statement. Competition in the job market between incoming immigrants and the settled population is nothing new in the history of migration, especially forced migration. In this case, however, one sees the element of trust reflecting a personal opinion. For example, when asked to respond to the statement, "The marriage of a Syrian refugee with one of my relatives would not be a problem for me," over half (50.7%) of the respondents were found to respond negatively (29.8% strongly disagreed and 20.9% disagreed).
Another revealing finding also related to trust refers to the statement, "Syrian refugees increase the crime rate in Turkey." Of the total respondents, 57.3% said they either agreed (30.7%) or strongly agreed (26.6%), as opposed to 24.3% of those who either disagreed (13.3%) or strongly disagreed (11%). It is worth noting that no evidence was found to suggest that crime rates have gone up in Turkey since the Syrian conflict began in 2011 (see Orhan & Gündoğar, 2015) . However, the most revealing finding related to the issue of trust comes from responses to the statement, "I'm afraid to talk to Syrians." Of the respondents, 66.4% answered that they either agreed (43.1%) or strongly agreed (23.3%) with the statement. Only 8.7% strongly disagreed and just 10.3% disagreed. 14.4% were undecided. On the question of reliability ("I find Syrians unreliable"), 30.9% were found to disagree or strongly disagree with the statement, while 45.2% either agreed or strongly agreed. Although it should be noted that 23.9% of respondents were undecided, once added to the previous responses, this results seems to point to the belief among Turkish respondents that Syrian immigrants are largely unreliable, untrustworthy and violent, and/or mischievous (as in being responsible for a perceived increase in crime rates). The issue of trust is also reflected in responses to the statement, "I do not hesitate to host Syrians at home." Of the Turkish respondents, 47.3% either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement (26.3% strongly disagree, 21% disagree). Again, it is worth noting that 23.5% of participants were undecided on the issue and that answers given to the question related to hosting a refugee at home may not simply reflect lack of trust or the presence of prejudice, but rather lack of financial and linguistic resources or simply a lack of space at home. Nevertheless, some evidence was found to suggest an overall negative attitude regarding Syrians in the two Turkish cities that were studied. For example, as an answer to the direct statement, "I do not like the idea of Syrian immigrants in Turkey," 52.2% of respondents were noted to either agree (25.4%) or strongly agree (26.8%) with the statement; 31.9% either disagreed (19.3%) or strongly disagreed (12.6%), while 15.9% were undecided.
Burden. Of our respondents, 46% answered positively to the question, "Syrian refugees negatively affect my life style." This suggests the notion that Syrians are considered a burden to the settled host-population. This becomes clearer when answers given to the statement, "I think Syrian immigrants provide a good opportunity for Turkey's economic development," is examined. In response, 70% of interviewees either disagreed (30.2%) or strongly disagreed (39.8%) with the statement. A negligible minority (5.1%) strongly agreed, 9.5% agreed, and 15.4% were undecided.
The right to work and education. Most of our Turkish sample agreed that Syrians should be given the right to work in Turkey. Responding to the statement, "Syrian refugees should have the right to work in Turkey," 44.7% of Turks either agreed (24.9%) or strongly agreed (19.8%) that this should be the case. However, a sizeable minority (38.9%) either disagreed (22.2%) or strongly disagreed (16.7%). This could be linked somehow to the perception of refugees being an economic burden. This works in two ways: a) allowing refugees to work lessens the opportunity for lower-income Turkish respondents to improve their chances in the job market (Syrians who come to Turkey are often skilled workers and therefore may be seen as competitors), or 2) for higher income Turkish respondents, it is better to let refugees work than have to provide them with benefits and resources that the host population does not wish to pay for.
Regarding the right to education as summarized in the statement, "Syrians should be given the right to education in Turkey," the Turkish sample responded positively, with 55.9% agreeing or strongly agreeing with the statement; 29.8% disagreed or strongly disagreed, and 14.3% were undecided.
Culture. One of the most striking differences in opinion was found when comparing the responses from Turks and Syrians regarding the statement, "I think Syrian immigrants are very similar to Turks in terms of culture and way of life." Of the Turkish sample, 70% answered negatively to the statement with 31.8% strongly disagreeing and 38.1% disagreeing.
Most Turkish respondents felt that Syrians do not make enough effort to adapt to Turkish culture. Regarding the statement, "I feel that Syrian refugees do not want to adapt to Turkish culture," 45.2% were found to either agree (29.6%) or strongly agree (15.6%) with the statement, while 30.9% either strongly disagreed (11.7%) or disagreed (19.2%). A significant percentage (23.9%) was undecided.
Interestingly, these results seem to contradict another similar study conducted in Gaziantep, a city much closer to the border with Syria (see Altengi et al., 2015) . That study was part of a report published by the Middle Eastern Development Network and the Center for Statistical Studies and Public Policy in Turkey. The report shows that of the 552 Turks interviewed in Gaziantep, 65.6% acknowledged that Turks and Syrians are culturally "very similar to each other" (p. 29). The current author's view is that the contrast between the two studies possibly indicates that opinions can shift dramatically from location to location, even though Mersin and Adana are geographically close (180 km) to Gaziantep. These changes in opinion most likely take place according to the social conditions experienced by both host and guest populations. For example, being geographically closer to the border could be an important factor in determining different perceptions about cultural proximity that exists in Gaziantep but which is absent in Mersin and Adana. More refined analyses that focus on each of these localities would be necessary for a better understanding of the host-guest relations and the challenges and opportunities these local variations entail regarding potential long-term settlement of Syrians in Turkey.
Language. Language is also clearly an important factor contributing to differences in attitudes between Syrians and Turks. Regarding the question, "I believe Syrian refugees should learn Turkish," 60.5% of respondents either agreed (41.5%) or strongly agreed (19%) with the statement. On the other hand, when asked to respond to the statement, "Turkish language prevents me from adapting to daily life," the majority of Syrian respondents answered positively: 61% agreed with the statement while 26% disagreed. By now, it is known that language acquisition is the cornerstone of any migration's success story, and that governments who facilitate language-learning improve the chances of better integrating foreign populations within mainstream society and culture. However, no evidence was found for such program implementations in Turkey, nor has any indication of future plans for its implementation been found despite the most recent pronouncements from the Turkish government that qualified Syrians may be given the chance to apply for Turkish citizenship (Al Jazeera, 2016).
Altruism. None of this detracts from the fact that most Turkish respondents agreed with the statement, "I believe we should help Syrian Refugees." One finds, for example, that 56.2% of Turkish respondents either agreed (36.5%) or strongly agreed (15.7%) that they should help Syrian refugees. What this help may entail, however, is difficult to assess. Most likely, underlying such attitudes is the idea that whatever assistance is given, it must be understood as a temporary measure and a charitable gesture. That being said, at this point one encounters a methodological barrier because the motivation to answer this statement positively is unclear considering this is the type of statement that carries positive connotations regarding the respondent. This is a problem because to be "altruistic" is often a highly regarded trait of one's personality, something particularly valued in Turkish culture and that is persistently re-enforced by government discourses on the duty to help "our Muslim brothers" (Al Jazeera, 2016), for example. Hence because of this bias, the question perhaps loses its objective value. Unfortunately, because of the high fluidity of the situation in Turkey, this was not anticipated during the research design phase. Thus, no precise interpretation of what this means can be offered.
Attitudes of Syrian Guests towards Turkish Hosts
Welcome versus acceptance. Although in the Turkish sample, a relatively high percentage of respondents suggest that they do not feel they should welcome Syrian refugees to their country, Syrian refugees do seem to feel welcomed by their hosts. More than half of them in fact agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, "I feel I am welcomed in Turkey" (59.9% in total; 44.8% agreeing and 15.1% strongly agreeing); 19.6% said they disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement (9.7% strongly disagree, 9.9% disagree). However, 20.5% were undecided. This initial statement characterizes much of the data, and sets the tone for what is to come. Many Syrian statements were positive towards their Turkish hosts. In comparison, the Turkish sample was much more negative towards their Syrian guests. However, negative responses are found regarding the infrastructure and social context surrounding Syrians in Turkey. For example, responses to the statement, "Being in Turkey doesn't give me the opportunity to develop myself," one finds that 45.7% of respondents either agreed (34.1%) or strongly agreed (11.6%) with it; 34.5% disagreed or strongly disagreed while 19.8% were undecided.
Almost half (46%) of Syrians answered negatively to the statement, "I don't feel accepted by Turkish people," meaning that they do not seem to feel directly discriminated. Nearly 30% felt that Turkish people did not accept them. Again, it is important to note that 24.2% were undecided. Following the statement, "I feel that Turkish people treat refugees well," more than half of the respondents (54.2%) were found to answer positively, whereas 22.4% felt that was not the case. Once again, the number of those undecided was relatively high (23.3%).
Trust and altruism. Syrian respondents also perceived the element of trust differently. When asked to respond to the statement, "I have made Turkish friends since I arrived," more than half of Syrian participants were found to acknowledge that they had befriended a Turkish person (52%) within the first few months of residence in Turkey, while 31% had not; 17% were not sure whether they could consider any of the Turkish people they had met as a friend. More than 70% of Syrians responded positively to the statement, "I have hosted Turkish people in my home." This was later revealed to the author to be a part of Syrian culture (not to mention that it is "sunnah" for Muslims); when moving to a new neighborhood, Syrian families offer food to neighbors, a practice that involves inviting strangers into their homes. In an attempt to measure altruism amongst the two groups (guests and hosts), Syrians were asked to answer the statement, "I see that Turkish people like to help." Responses from Syrian participants revealed that 61.8% agreed with the statement while 18.2% did not; 20% were undecided. On the other hand, when looking at the Turkish responses, 52.2% were found to either agree (36.5%) or strongly agree (15.7%) that they should help Syrian refugees. Culture. One of the most striking differences in opinion was found when comparing the responses of Turks and Syrians regarding the statement, "I feel Syrian immigrants are very similar to Turkish people in terms of their culture and way of life;" 69.9% of Turks answered negatively to the statement, 31.8% strongly disagreeing, 38.1% disagreeing, and a marginal 4% strongly agreeing. However, looking at the answers from Syrians regarding the same question, one finds that 64.1% of them answered positively to a similar statement ("I feel that Turkish culture is similar to my culture") with 21.7% disagreeing (8.5% strongly disagreed; 13.2% disagreed). This reveals a large difference between the two groups regarding their perceived cultural proximity and differences. Syrians seem more eager to see the culture of the host community as similar to their own than the host community was to acknowledge cultural proximity between themselves and their guests. Work and life opportunities. Perhaps the most important divergence in perceptions was found when respondents were asked to answer the statement, "My Syrian identity does not prevent me from finding a job." The difference appears between those who can and those who cannot access the job market because of their nationality. Of the Syrian respondents, 42.9% were found to disagree with the statement, whereas 41.6% agreed, leaving 15.5% undecided. This split in opinion within the Syrian group shows that the sample was divided between two groups: those who perceived discrimination in the job market and those who did not. Unfortunately, the data does not allow for an exploration of the reasons as to why this split should occur. Thus, further enquiry in this area is needed. The reason this could be important is that considering the current Syrian population in Turkey has reached a number estimated at anything between 2.7 and 3 million people (UNHRC, 2016), these findings, though not representative, must be placed within the context of a large population of unemployed and/or underpaid workers. The problem is that once the attitude of potential Turkish employers towards Syrians is considered within the context of the overall negative opinions so far discussed, it may in fact enhance the difficulties already presented by those lacking a proficient command of the Turkish language, in addition to the real shortage of job openings in the local markets resulting from the deceleration of the Turkish economy and the devaluation of the Turkish Lira in the recent past. Answering the statement, "I would hire Syrians to work for me," 46.9% of Turkish respondents either disagreed (20.4%) or strongly disagreed (26.5%) with the statement; 36.1% either agreed (26.3%) or strongly agreed (9.8%), and 17.1% were undecided. Despite that, Syrians seem to be generally content with how their most basic needs have been met so far (e.g., housing, schooling, and health care). In the statement, "I can access basic services such as health and housing," 60.7% of respondents were found to be positive about this, while 25.5% were not. Again, this may reflect the fact that our sample was relatively well-educated, had better access to resources, and therefore a more middle-class lifestyle. Nevertheless, the topic of resources allocated to Syrians is a source of contention between the populations that have been studied, and research findings may be dramatically influenced by location, as different results have been found between cities such as Mersin, Gaziantep, and Istanbul. For example, a qualitative study conducted by Dawn Chatty (in press), an anthropologist working at the Refugee Studies Centre in Oxford University, showed that the most pervasive preoccupation amongst the local Turkish population was the belief that more benefits were being given to Syrians than to Turkish citizens themselves. She also found that, when compared to the situation of Syrians in Lebanon and Jordan, those in Turkey faired far better in terms of the provisions made available to them. She also noted a higher general sense of well-being among Syrians in Turkey as opposed to those in Jordan and Lebanon.
Overall, Syrians in Turkey seem to fare better than their counterparts in Jordan and Lebanon. However, that may simply be because in the latter countries Syrians are undergoing exceptionally high levels of hardship and discrimination. This should not detract from the fact that Syrians in need in Turkey, those with little or no economic or social capital to bank on, are only furnished with the bare minimum: the right to enter and remain in Turkey and the ability to go to a hospital in case of an emergency. Also, attitudes towards Syrians amongst Turkish populations that were studied reveal the perception that Syrians are an economic burden. They are often accused of taking advantage of the benefits provided to them by Turkish society without adding or contributing economically to the country.
At the risk of facing economic hardship as they migrate to the Turkish inner cities, the refugees who are more mobile and have access to more income will pursue life in the city despite lacking Turkish language skills or the restrictions imposed by law or the job market. This undoubtedly has an impact on how Syrians and Turks come to relate to one another. The report by Altengi et al. (2015) for example, shows that "...the harmonization of Syrians with Turkish society decreases by 36.7% for Syrians who face economic, social, and legal problems" (p. 15). However, when we asked Syrians whether they believed the Turkish government provides them with enough to live by ("I feel that the assistance provided by the Turkish government is enough"), more Syrians answered negatively than positively: 44.5% said they either disagree (25%) or strongly disagree (19.5%), and 21.1% were undecided. When respondents were asked to answer a statement about whether Europe was more enticing than Turkey, 68.2% were found to answer positively ("Syrian refugees who have gone to European countries find more privileges than here"). Only 19.4% answered that that was not the case. Here one sees the pull-effect Europe creates among the displaced population of conflict-ridden countries in the eastern Mediterranean basin.
Perceptions about discrimination. Despite some of the positive views Syrian reported, whether about their Turkish hosts or how they are being treated in Turkey in general, Syrians nevertheless feel stigmatized. For example, as an answer to the statement, "When a Syrian does something wrong all Syrians get blamed," 75.3% were found to agree (33.2%) or strongly agree (42.1%) with it. Only 12.7% disagreed (8%) or strongly disagreed (4.7%). When asked to react to the statement, "People discriminate against me publicly," the majority of Syrian respondents answered negatively. Nearly half of the sample (49.1%) either disagreed (32.8%) or strongly disagreed (16.3%), compared to the 28.4% who either agreed or strongly agreed. This shows three things: (a) There is a marked difference between attitudes and actual behavior (opinions and actions) of Turks towards Syrians. This would explain why the opinions of Turkish respondents, although mostly negative, did not make Syrians feel they had ever experienced direct discrimination (broadly defined). However, (b) Syrians found questions about discriminatory behavior rather ambiguous. That is, it is possible that their understanding of the word discrimination was based on the idea of physical aggression or verbal abuse -none of which they felt they had experienced in the cities that were studied. However, (c) even when discrimination was identified, under the conditions of being allowed to live in a country, immigrants may not want to highlight discriminatory behavior for fear of being marked or identified by officials, especially in those cases where the person is waiting for a visa or permit to remain in the country, work, travel abroad, or for a response from a school or university application. This can happen despite the research team reassuring each participant as to the strong ethical guidelines that orient this research and the anonymity clause.
Furthermore, and still on the theme of respondents' perception regarding their place in Turkish society, Syrian participants were asked to give their opinion concerning the statement, "I feel alienated by Turkish people when I speak Arabic in public places." The result was that the majority of respondents felt that speaking Arabic in public attracted negative attention to them (42.40% [29.6% agreed, 12.8% strongly agreed]), 36.4% disagreed with the statement (12.1% strongly disagreed), and 21.2% were undecided. The perception of negative behavior is felt to be more apparent because the statement makes a detailed description of the implied behavior. This makes it easier for participants to decide whether this has happened to them or not, as opposed to the more abstract word discrimination.
General Discussion: Immigrant Typologies and Guest-Host Relations in Turkey
Immigrants, refugees, or asylum seekers who cross sovereign borders and arrive in a new country are often perceived as the classic anthropological other. The pervasiveness of this other is seen expressed in foundational works of sociology such as George Simmel's The Stranger (1908) , in the work of Robert Park and Ernest Burgess (1921) , Norbert Elias and John L. Scotson (The Established and the Outsiders, 1965) , and of course, in the influential work of Zigmunt Baumann (1995), particularly his notions on modern and post-modern outsiders.
From this earlier literature one learns that the other or stranger is constructed in diverse ways related to legal status (i.e., when people are classified as aliens in English, aussländer in German, extracomunitari in Italian or yabancı in Turkish), for instance. People from outside may also in fact be classified on account of their physical appearance (race); their ethnic, cultural, and religious differences; economic characteristics (as in economic migrants); or any combination of these categories. One other pervasive characteristic of the outsider found in literature is the temporal element applied to the condition of being the other. Namely, it is the assumption that the other, or stranger, is and will remain an outsider on account of the short-lived contact between the two groups. Indeed, one sees an example in the work of Rinus Penninx (2004) that the first and most basic type of policy regarding immigration is "...the one that defines the immigrant principally as an alien and outsider, who is only temporarily part of society. That society emphatically does not define itself as an immigration country, and migrants are therefore temporary 'guests'" (italics added; p. 22).
As opposed to the Americas, those self-defined immigrant nations, the old world of Europe has been overwhelmingly prone to apply the guest policy, placing the other in a permanent state of temporary residence. The guest policy has been applied in Europe during the 1950's and 1970's, especially in Germany, but also in other countries such as the United Kingdom where immigrant workers from the former British colonies were expected to return to their homelands after their work contracts expired. The guest policy is described in Michel Alexander's (2003) typology of immigration policies, one that he defines also as a non-policy on account of its laissez-faire nature.
But are typologies of immigration with a focus on post-war Europe relevant to the assessment of the case of Syrian refugees in Turkey in the 21 st century? The answer is both yes and no. This is because Syrians in Turkey are not recognized as refugees in the legal sense of the word. Initially referred to as guests since 2011, Syrians were subsequently granted the status of temporary protection. As Turkey has not signed the 1967 UN Protocol on refugees that lifted the geographical limitations of the 1951 Geneva Convention on refugees, it claims no obligation to give Syrians official refugee status. Syrians in Turkey are neither refugees, nor are they allowed to become legally bound immigrants tout court (those with working visas or permanent residence permits). They are neither functioning members of Turkish society (only a minority of Syrian youths go to school or universities in Turkey), nor are they recognized by migration policies that would grant them working visas and a clear social status or securities. Indeed, for Korkut (in press), "the restrictive Turkish asylum regime and aversive Turkish public philosophy to immigration have enforced political authorities to continuously resort to discursive rather than institutionalized means to handle the impacts of forced migration" (p. 1).
The invisibility of concrete migration policies in Turkey is quite striking considering the EU-Turkey deal that sealed an international migration management agreement on the basis of "helping refugees." Instead, one witnesses mass migration being discretely controlled through discourses that revolve around the axis of charity, which are in turn intrinsically linked to the widespread notion of a distinct Turkish hospitality towards the acceptable refugee, thought of as the Muslim other and often depicted as a threat, an administration problem, and economic burden (Yıldırım & Tekdemir Yurtdaş, 2016) by the population while the government contradictorily emphasizes the need to help Syrians on the basis of their common Muslim identity.
Typologies of immigration policies seem to be overwhelmingly biased towards classic countries of immigration (mainly Europe and North America), and immigration research has yet to incorporate new thinking regarding emerging economies such as Turkey who are now simultaneously both sending and receiving countries (see Boucher & Gest, 2015) , as well as a corridor through which transit refugees journey in their hope to reach another country. Hence, and given this complexity, if one wants to achieve better understanding of the situation of Syrians in Turkey by implementing a classification of immigration policies as proposed by Alexander (2003) , for example (to cite one well-known typological scheme) one would quickly realize that the assessment of the Turkish (local and national) policies regarding Syrian asylum seekers would have to fall within what Alexander calls "the transient attitude" (p. 417).
Alexander describes four main attitudes toward otherness on the part of local authorities in Europe: the transient, the guestworker, the assimilationist, and the pluralist. Unfortunately, these are mostly inapplicable in the case of Syrians in Turkey because Alexander's theorizing takes for granted the autonomy and democratic vein of localities within European spaces. The situation of Syrians in Turkey, however, must be contextualized, for it occurs in the midst of an increasingly centralized state dominated by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party that heavily dictates uniform directives from Ankara without really considering the needs and differences in host-guest populations within these localities. The current Turkish refugee system therefore eschews classification because in its (perhaps purposeful) confusion, it offers Syrians no real structural or practical migration policy that can be realistically followed. Perhaps for this reason, one observes the transient attitude predominantly among the discourses of the local officials in the two cities studied here for whom the mass migration of Syrians into the country is something that, at best, should be considered an act of kindness towards a neighboring Muslim population in need of respite and, at worse, a situation to be completely ignored. The same discourses are found on the street level, as the research presented here reveals. More recently, however, pronouncements from both the Turkish government and media have been witnessed that point to a potential integration of a select group of Syrians who are to be offered Turkish citizenship. This move would cement the looming probability that Syrians are here to stay, and that they should now be recognized as an Arabic-speaking ethnic minority within Turkey. This leads one to classify the current Turkish refugee or asylum regime as a selective and temporary settlement.
It is not geography that dictates that Turkey needs to be a transit country but rather its internal state bureaucracy in conjunction with its foreign policy. Of course, transit country is a term that also alludes to the nature of the aspirations of the victims of forced migration who have seen Turkey as a corridor into Europe and the rest of the world. This has occurred partly because of the belief among displaced people from Syria and those populations coming from other countries in the region that Turkey does not offer an infrastructure that would allow for sustainable long-term settlement, allow them to receive either refugee or citizen rights, or offer them real life opportunities of any kind (see also Gümüş & Eroğlu, 2015) . Hence, new thinking and more research needs to take place if one is to understand the new patterns of migratory flows that place Turkey center-stage in the so-called European refugee crisis. This is also valid for asylum policies and how responses to immigration (particularly local) can make a world of difference with regards to not only the security but also the potential prosperity of outsiders. This change in perception could also favor the very communities in emerging middle-income countries that do the hosting.
A step forward would be to conduct research that casts light on how the victims of forced migration make a living in environments that offer them little infrastructural conditions to do so. A study recently conducted in Uganda, for example, has found evidence that challenges what the authors of that study call the five predominant myths regarding refugees. These are that refugees are economically isolated, that they are a burden on host states, that they are economically homogenous, that they are technologically illiterate, and that they are dependent on humanitarian assistance (see Betts, Bloom, Kaplan, & Omata, 2014) . Contrary to the perception often propagated in the world media, Syrians are economically, socially, and culturally diverse. The ORSAM report, which was mentioned in the introduction, shows that Syrian refugees are resourceful individuals. They open large, medium, and small businesses; they find ways to be self-employed even in the most adverse of circumstances. The report also makes clear that because of the nationalism inherent in asylum policies and discourses on refugees, Turkey has missed the chance to have more investments from Syria in its struggling markets. The report also clearly outlines that because of the assumption that Syrians are only in Turkey temporarily, little has been done to ensure their rights or give them incentives to invest in Turkey and become financially independent. After listing a series of worrying findings regarding the situation of Syrians in Turkey, including the rise in child labor, dilapidation of neighborhoods, and lack of appropriate access to services and employment, the authors of that report describe Turkey as "a suitable environment for ethnic and sectarian polarization" (Orhan, 2015, p. 7) . The report recommends the creation of:
… an immigration policy that includes the prevention of reactions from the local communities. The issue should be considered as a social integration problem. There should be a holistic policy covering education, working conditions, accommodation, social services and improving the receptivity of the host community. (p. 9)
The lack of a concrete immigration policy with tangible outreaching effects translates into a lack of rights; this is part of the difficulty in seeing displaced people as those who inhabit the spaces outside of the nation state. It is what Wimmer and Schiller (2002) called methodological nationalism, by which they meant that "In nationalist doctrine as well as according to the container model of society, immigrants must appear as antinomies to an orderly working of the state and society" (p. 227). In this case, Syrians are seen as weak and in need of help and charity. They could have stayed in Syria and resisted against their oppressors (as Turks did after the fall of the Ottoman Empire), but they chose to give up the fight and instead come to Turkey (Yıldırım & Tekdemir Yurtdaş, 2016) . According to Tolay (2013) :
The Turkish public appears to be confused, relatively indifferent, without clear-cut fixed views on migration, relatively exclusive in their expressed ideas towards immigrants, and yet relatively self-gratifying; on the issue of Syrian refugees, they see asylum increasingly through a political lens. (p. 2) Considering the previously discussed findings emerging from the present enquiry, it would be hard to disagree with this view.
Conclusion
Taking all this into account, the present enquiry has offered a small contribution towards fulfilling the need for more studies that look at the relationship between guest and host communities in urban spaces, which the majority of Syrian refugees in Turkey now inhabit, away from the monotony and limitations of guest camps. For a combination of reasons, both the host population and the guests largely see Turkey as a transitional and temporary refuge. But such views will most likely begin to change given the increasing securitization of EU external borders and the new deal signed between Turkey and the EU to keep refugees in Turkey. This mental framework built around the idea of temporary protection rather than permanent integration (whatever meaning we may wish to give to the word integration) could also be transformed if real infrastructural improvements were made in Turkey that target each locality. This would have to be a policy that was sensitive to the cultural and economic contexts of each urban space and the number of refugees living there.
Although, negative opinions do not necessarily equate to negative actions or outright prejudice, negative opinions can distort the relations between groups and inform many potential prejudices that may emerge from the lack of full contact (language barriers, urban segregation) and misleading perceptions (i.e., Syrian culture is very different from Turkish culture; Syrians are prone to violence, untrustworthy and thus an economic burden). More importantly, this distortion can have an impact on a person's chances to improve their condition within the host society, therefore seeking alternatives elsewhere through perilous journeys, even at the risk of dying. Even if Turkey seems like the exception of solidarity towards refugees on the surface, boredom, lack of opportunities, cultural isolation, language differences, lack of participatory citizenship, and a general sense of being mistrusted and unwanted -all consequences of an ineffective asylum regime -can be powerful triggers for economic hardships, social awkwardness and deep personal discontentment all of which can result in psychological distress.
Under these conditions, people will risk everything, including their lives, for the possibility of living a dignified life where they feel more like contributing citizens and less like passive objects of charity. Therefore, a dramatic change of policy in Turkey is desperately needed, one that allows for Syrians to work and encourages new thinking regarding Syrian people not as a burden but as potential. This will not solve the problems faced by Syrians in Turkey, in Europe, or elsewhere, but it will surely be a good beginning.
